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Abstract
I develop a measure of changing tail risk perceptions based on global finan-
cial shocks reflecting ‘flights-to-safety’. Large flight-to-safety shocks are defined as
joint tail realizations of returns across major risky and safe asset classes. Flight-to-
safety shocks are substantially distinct from VIX innovations, map to unexpected
global events, inform future changes in world prices and interest rates, and reflect
both risk sentiment and global demand. Estimating a multi-country structural
VAR with country-specific heterogeneity, I show that global flight-to-safety shocks
induce a sharp rise in sovereign risk and exchange market pressure, followed by
a subsequent drop in economic activity in both emerging markets and the U.S.
However, the macroeconomic effects of flight-to-safety shocks are far from uniform
across emerging markets, with domestic financial factors moderating the transmis-
sion mechanism. Countries realizing larger sovereign risk adjustment or sharper
currency depreciation from a flight-to-safety shock are subject to deeper subse-
quent economic contractions. The impact of flight-to-safety shocks on economic
activity is four times larger for emerging markets with substantial presence in U.S.
exchange traded funds. By contrast, leaning against the wind by aggressively ex-
pending international reserves limits the economic impact of global flight-to-safety
shocks, with its effectiveness rising when the exchange rate is successfully stabilized.
Keywords: Tail Risk, Risk-off, Risk Sentiment, Global Shocks, Contagion,
International Spillovers, Sovereign Risk, Monetary Policy, Capital Flows, Emerging
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1 Introduction
Macroeconomic vulnerabilities to sharp swings in global financial conditions were once
more highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Concerns over a global public health
crisis left emerging markets particularly exposed, induced large and volatile capital out-
flows, currency depreciation, and sharply wider borrowing costs as presented in Figure
1. Despite the uniqueness of the pandemic shock, it shares the signatures of many unan-
ticipated left-tail economic events: a ‘flight-to-safety’ or alternatively, ‘risk-off’.1 These
refer to abrupt, violent swings across financial markets in the form of falling risky as-
set prices and rising safe asset prices associated with aggressive portfolio rebalancing of
global investors. Flights-to-safety directly shape the evolution of the global financial cycle,
reflecting both changing risk appetite and expectations over global demand. Flights-to-
safety have increased in severity in the last decade amid an era of unprecedented global
liquidity.2
Figure 1: COVID-19 and Emerging Markets
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In this paper, I present a new measure of shocks to tail risk perceptions based on sys-
tematic features of global flight-to-safety episodes. These flight-to-safety shocks intend
to capture unpredictable swings in global financial cycles, with large shocks especially
reflecting re-evaluation of global tail risk. Specifically, large values of the measure cap-
tures joint tail realizations across a set of major risky and safe asset prices. My proposed
methodology to identify flight-to-safety shocks is transparent, easily generalized and mod-
ifiable. Global flight-to-safety shocks carry distinct information apart from benchmark
measures of global financial conditions, they are informative of future world prices and
1‘Flight-to-safety’ and ‘global financial shock’ are used interchangeably throughout the paper. Simi-
larly, ‘global financial cycles’ and ‘global financial conditions’ are synonymous.
2See Figure 3.
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interest rates, and map to historically disruptive events. While global flight-to-safety
episodes have become a widely regarded financial phenomena, there is little evidence
linking their impact to macroeconomic fluctuations. I show that global flight-to-safety
shocks bear significant implications for the global economy. The impact of global flight-
to-safety shocks on economic activity across emerging markets in particular are far from
uniform, and I show that several domestic financial factors are significantly linked to this
heterogeneity.
This paper makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it presents a new
measure of financial shocks emphasizing tail risk perceptions by identifying global flights-
to-safety. Second, it develops a multi-country structural VAR with country specific het-
erogeneity to model how emerging market dynamics respond to a global flight-to-safety
shock. By exploiting country-specific heterogeneity, I identify several possible sources
through which global shocks can shape macroeconomic dynamics.
I propose a method to identify shocks in to global financial markets which capture
tail risk perceptions, by identifying global flights-to-safety behavior across risky and safe
asset classes. While asset prices are largely unpredictable at short horizons, their dis-
tribution is not entirely unpredictable, and I exploit this feature to measure shifts in
tail risk perceptions. Conceptually, as an asset’s return grows too large to be justi-
fied by their conditional standard deviation/volatility, 1) the likelihood that it reflects
an unanticipated shock rises towards certainty, and 2) the return reflects a realization
in the tail of the conditional distribution. I identify daily asset price shocks within a
asymmetric-GARCH (Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity) model
of conditional volatility, using this method across several major asset classes: equities,
volatility, exchange rates, and interest rates. In a second step, I aggregate these asset-
specific price shocks while imposing a condition such that their co-movement satisfies the
covariance structure observed during flight-to-safety. I define this as rising volatility, ris-
ing safe asset prices, and rising safe-haven currency prices along with depreciating risky
asset and risky currency prices. Moreover, the flight-to-safety condition can be made
more conservative by imposing restrictions on both the covariance and the size of the
shocks. Unlike known-unknown events such as monetary policy or macroeconomic news
announcements, the events triggering global flight-to-safety shocks tend to be unknown-
unknowns – unusual, unexpected, and unique. As such, large global flights-to-safety
reflect changing tail risk perceptions. My approach admits to identifying such global
flight-to-safety shocks in a systematic, transparent and general way.
Global flight-to-safety shocks represent a distinct source of variation from benchmark
indices of global financial conditions (e.g. VIX). They map to economically disruptive
events, inform contemporaneous and future changes in world commodity prices, interest
rates, exchange rates and inflation expectations, therefore embedded in them are both
components reflecting shifting risk sentiment and global demand. Using global flight-
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to-safety shocks as external instruments, I model their impact on emerging markets in
a multi-country structural VAR. My modeling framework extends beyond standard ap-
proaches by allowing for country-specific heterogeneity (unlike panel VARs/regressions
which pool information across countries), incorporating interdependencies between coun-
tries, and controlling for spillovers from advanced economies, namely the United States.
In response to a global flight-to-safety shock, emerging market sovereign spreads
sharply widen, exchange market pressure rises, and a drop in economic activity follows.
On average, industrial production contracts by 0.625 standard deviations, or four percent
over an 18-month window following a 1-standard deviation global flight-to-safety shock.
However, the effects of global flight-to-safety are far from uniform across countries, the
heterogeneity being linked to domestic financial factors. The impact of global flight-
to-safety shocks on economic activity is larger when flight-to-safety shocks also induce
sharper sovereign spread adjustment and deeper currency depreciation upon impact. I
also show that the impact of global flight-to-safety on economic activity is significantly
amplified – roughly by a factor of 4 – in countries which have substantial presence in
U.S. traded ETFs. By contrast, countries which more aggressively expend international
reserves in response to a flight-to-safety shock are subject to less severe subsequent eco-
nomic contractions. This buffering effect from policies that lean against the wind is
strongest when the exchange rate is successfully stabilized.
This paper contributes to the active literature investigating the global macroeconomic
implications of financial shocks and global financial cycles (Uribe and Yue [2006], Akinci
[2013], Rey [2015], Aizenman et al. [2016], Caballero et al. [2019], Obstfeld et al. [2019],
Kalemli-Ozcan [2019], Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2019], Miranda-Agrippino and Rey [2020]).
This issue has received renewed attention in light of deep global financial integration
occurring over the past two decades, and the concerns raised over global financial stability.
My focus on emerging markets, which are particularly prone to global financial shocks,
aligns closely with Uribe and Yue [2006], Akinci [2013], Caballero et al. [2019], and
Obstfeld et al. [2019].
My work intends to extend upon from the prevailing literature, departing from it in
several ways. First, by introducing a new measure of tail risk perceptions, I specifically
quantify the financial and economic effects associated with global flights-to-safety or risk-
off shocks, which I define, and subsequently show, as being distinct from more general
financial fluctuations. This way, my work ties the literature on global financial cycles to
that on flights-to-safety and risk-on/risk-off (Caballero and Krishnamurthy [2008], Beber
et al. [2014], De Bock and de Carvalho Filho [2015b], Caballero and Kamber [2019], Baele
et al. [2019]). On the development and measurement of financial shocks, my work also
relates to Gilchrist and Zakrajsek [2012], Caballero et al. [2019] and Cesa-Bianchi et al.
[2019], all of which introduce new, yet different measures of financial shocks, quantifying
their macroeconomic impact. While the former two focus on country-specific measures of
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external finance premia, the latter develops a global measure of financial volatility. Like
the latter, my measure intends to capture global shocks of a particular type.
Additionally, in modeling emerging market dynamics I allow for country-specific het-
erogeneity, thereby estimating both average pooled effects a la panel VARs while also
showing that the effects of flight-to-safety shocks vary widely across countries. My mod-
eling approach follows similar methods applied in Fernandez et al. [2017] and Cesa-Bianchi
et al. [2019], the former quantifying the contribution of world commodity shocks and the
latter studying the impact of global uncertainty shocks. Both allow for country-specific
heterogeneity and highlight its importance. I use the country-specific variation admitted
by my model to link differences in the macroeconomic impact of global flight-to-safety
shocks to domestic financial factors, suggesting particular policy implications.
On the transmission and policy implications of global shocks, the association be-
tween wider sovereign spreads and subsequently deeper economic contractions induced
by global flight-to-safety shocks is consistent the pass-through of global financial shocks
depending on the sensitivity of domestic financial factors (Akinci [2013], Aizenman et al.
[2016], Kalemli-Ozcan [2019]). That currency depreciation is associated with subse-
quently deeper contractions points to a financial channel of exchange rates associated with
currency mismatch (Eichengreen and Hausmann [1999] Hofmann et al. [2019], Carstens
and Shin [2019], Miranda-Agrippino and Rey [2020]), contrasting conventional wisdom
related to the buffering effects of a flexible exchange rate as argued in Obstfeld et al.
[2019], and rather, supportive of stabilization policies among financially developing coun-
tries Aghion et al. [2009]. The potential for an ETF channel to significantly amplify
the effects of global flight-to-safety shocks is consistent with Converse et al. [2020] and
more broadly the risks associated with volatile capital flows. The buffering effects of
expending international reserves amid a global flight-to-safety shock are consistent with
research citing the insurance benefits of reserves accumulation (Aizenman and Lee [2007],
Jeanne and Ranciere [2011], Aizenman and Jinjarak). Although particularly novel about
my findings is that it shows the buffering effects of leaning against the wind through
expending reserves, beyond the signaling benefits of having large stocks of reserves.
Theoretically, global flights-to-safety may arise from unexpected news shocks to beliefs
over global demand (Jaimovich and Rebelo [2009], Barsky and Sims [2011], Kurmann and
Otrok [2013]) or shocks to global risk appetite or uncertainty (Bloom [2009], Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde et al. [2011], Christiano et al. [2014] Alessandri and Mumtaz [2019], Cesa-
Bianchi et al. [2019]. There is considerable theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting
that news shocks and risk shocks are connected: large macroeconomic shocks arise from
news shocks and endogenously generate time-varying risk premia (i.e. left-tail shocks,
Danielsson and Shin [2003], Orlik and Veldkamp [2014], Cascaldi-Garcia and Galvao
[2018], Berger et al. [2020]). Any attempt to empirically identify the effect of say, global
financial shocks, will have to separate these two components, and my empirical results
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support views of the latter class of models. I investigate this issue further in the Online
Supplement, Section S2.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the con-
struction of global flight-to-safety shocks. Section 3 studies their impact on world prices
and interest rates. Section 4 then introduces a multi-country VAR to investigate how
global flight-to-safety shocks shape macroeconomic dynamics. Section 5 introduces mea-
sures of exchange market pressure – exchange rates and international reserves – into the
VAR model. Section 6 discusses the heterogeneity in country-specific responses to global
flight-to-safety shocks. Section 7 links country-specific heterogeneity to domestic finan-
cial factors as transmission mechanisms of global shocks. Section 8 specifically focuses on
the role of U.S. ETFs as an amplifying mechanism of global flight-to-safety on emerging
markets and Section 9 assess the joint explanatory power of financial factors as trans-
mitters of global financial shocks in explaining differences in macroeconomic sensitivity.
Section 10 concludes. In the Online Supplement, Section S2 discusses and separates
global flight-to-safety shocks into both risk sentiment and global demand components,
and investigates their relative contribution in affecting world prices and emerging market
dynamics.
2 Global Flight-to-Safety Shocks
Macroeconomic shocks fall into two categories: Known-unknowns and unknown-unknowns.
Stochastic realizations of a known event represent the former category. Some examples of
these include monetary policy announcements, macroeconomic news releases, and elec-
tions – all of which are anticipated but can lead to surprises. The size of the surprise
is often measured by daily or intra-day changes in asset prices around the known event.
Recent advances in measuring these known-unknown shocks primarily come from high-
frequency identification techniques.
By contrast, flight-to-safety (FTS) shocks fall into the category of unknown-unknowns.
Unknown-unknowns refer to stochastic realizations stemming from completely unantic-
ipated events. While these shocks present greater measurement challenges, they reflect
some the the most impactful shocks to the macroeconomy. Some examples of these in-
clude the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the Arab Spring, and the COVID-19 pandemic.
Qualitatively, they tend to have unique origins, reflecting tail risks. Thankfully, they
leave behind highly similar patterns in the way they disrupt global financial markets. I
exploit this feature to develop a measure of these unknown-unknown tail shocks, which I
refer to as global flight-to-safety shocks.
The unexpected and idiosyncratic nature of global flights-to-safety makes them dif-
ficult to measure from any set of particular events the way known-unknowns can be
identified. However, they do leave behind repeated, systematic signatures in global fi-
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nancial markets in the form of: falling risky asset prices, rising safe asset prices and
rising volatility, at the same time. My approach for identifying flight-to-safety shocks
specifically imposes this co-movement restriction across realized returns of major finan-
cial assets. Moreover, to measure the size of the shock, I consider the size of asset-specific
return relative to their ex ante conditional distribution. These shocks are then aggre-
gated across asset classes. Large shocks, therefore, reflect joint tail realizations across
asset returns.
2.1 Stage 1: Measuring asset market shocks
I consider five global financial asset benchmarks due to their international presence: The
Wilshire 5000 equity index, 10-year U.S. Treasury yields, the Japanese Yen/Australian
Dollar exchange rate, the U.S. corporate high yield spread and the CBOE VIX index.
The Wilshire 5000 index represents the broad U.S. stock market, while 10-year Treasuries
are one of the worlds most sought after safe investments. The JPY/AUD exchange rate
proxies for spot movements in the G10 carry trade. The Japanese yen acts famously as
a safe haven currency, appreciating amid turmoil while the Australian Dollar tends to
be risky in the sense that it covaries positively with global economic cycles. Therefore,
the Yen tends to depreciate against the Australian Dollar during expansions times while
appreciating during periods of global economic stress. The U.S. corporate high yield
spread reflects the average financing premium faced by U.S. firms that are rated below
investment grade. Finally, the VIX index is a common gauge for global investor risk
appetite, uncertainty. It specifically measures the option-implied expected forward 1-
month volatility of the S&P 500 stock market index.3
One could easily add additional assets to the set A, for example, German bond yields
to incorporate Europe’s role as a financial center alongside the U.S.. Another considera-
tion would be to include gold prices. However, I omit gold from the baseline estimation
for several reasons. First, the price of gold tends to be strongly determined by other
factors, like finite supply, the real interest rate and inflation. Second as a commodity,
gold prices are subject to different demand forces than traditional financial assets and
its market is dwarfed by the size of other safe asset markets. Lastly, the allocation of
major global investors and intermediaries to gold is disproportionately small in compari-
son to safe financial assets. However, the persistence of gold’s role as an alternative safe
asset throughout history is impressive, therefore it can easily be incorporated in a simple
extension.
3Notice that four of the five benchmark assets are U.S. centric and therefore, I make the naive
assumption that global shocks are largely U.S. based. While this may reasonable in the current state,
global economic centers shift over time. My approach is general enough such that one can easily add
more financial benchmarks to the set, say from Europe or China to account for other important economic
centers. Alternatively, this approach can be applied to construct region-specific flight-to-safety shocks.
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Denote rad ∈ {rvd, rsd, rbd, rjd, rhd} as the daily return (logged-difference) of asset
a ∈ A = {v, s, b, j, h} over day d, where v refers to the VIX, s refers to the Wilshire 5000
index, b refers to the 10-year Treasury yield, j refers to the JPY/AUD exchange rate and
h refers to the U.S. corporate high yield spread. The global FTS index is constructed as
an aggregation of normalized daily innovations across these assets. I define daily shocks in
each asset by comparing the realized return on day d+1, ra,d+1, to the ex ante conditional
volatility forecast for day d+ 1, made on day d:
Zad =
rad
Ed−1[σad]
. (1)
This step serves three important purposes. First, the volatility of returns vary sub-
stantially across assets and over time. Normalizing asset returns by their conditional
volatility produces a transformation admits to comparing across assets classes and ac-
counts for regime changes (i.e. volatility clustering). Second, under the assumption that
Za,d+1 follows an i.i.d. standard normal distribution (it is, after all, a conditional z-score),
the probability that return ra,d+1 was unexpected rises in Za,d+1. Hence, large values of
Za,d+1 are increasingly likely to reflect true exogenous shocks in the sense that they were
unforeseeable. Third, large values of Zad are easily interpreted as tail-shocks. Therefore
a key distinction of FTS shocks compared to more readily available measures of financial
conditions is that it specifically captures shifts in tail risk perceptions. I later validate
these interpretations by documenting that when large values of Za,d+1 are realized across
assets a, they map to unexpected, globally disruptive events.
While rad is observed, σad is not and must be estimated. To estimate Ed[σa,d+1],
a model which allows for time-varying volatility must be specified. I assume that asset
returns are mean zero with time-varying volatility following a GARCH process (Bollerslev
[1986]):
rad = σadzad, zad ∼ N (0, 1), (2)
where the return sequence is mean zero, and split into a stochastic i.i.d component
(zad) and a time-varying volatility component (σad). Notice that our estimates of asset-
specific shocks Zad is the same as zad, the exogenous component of asset returns under the
specified model structure. I parameterize zad as being drawn from a normal distribution,
hence conditional returns are normally distributed but the unconditional distribution
are allowed to be fat-tailed4. Specifically the conditional variance at time d follows a
GJR-GARCH(1,1) process:5
4One can parameterize zad as being drawn from a Student-T’s distribution which allows for both fat
tails in conditional and unconditional distributions, and the results are virtually unchanged.
5See Glosten et al. [1993] for the extension of GARCH to GJR-GARCH. Alternatively one could use
another model for time-varying volatility, for example stochastic (latent) volatility models. These typi-
cally rely on computationally intensive Bayesian approaches to estimate them and further assumptions
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σ2ad = ωa + αaσ
2
a,d−1 + (βa + γaIa,d−1)r
2
a,d−1, where (3)
Ia,d−1 =


0 if ra,d−1 > 0
1 if ra,d−1 < 0.
(4)
The conditional volatility model under a GJR-GARCH extends the classical GARCH
framework by allowing for asymmetric volatility, a well-known stylized fact of financial
asset returns where the conditional variance of an asset is correlated with returns. The
expected volatility for day d+ 1 conditional on day d information is computed as:
Ed−1[σad] =
√
E[σ2ad] =
√
ωa + αaσ2a,d−1 + (βa + γaIa,d−1)r
2
a,d−1 (5)
Referring back to Equation 1, I finally recover shocks to asset a by dividing its observed
realization on day d + 1 with the ex ante standard deviation for d + 1. In other words,
we simply ask: to what degree was the realized move justifiable under the prevailing (ex
ante) forecast distribution? Larger values imply tail realizations, and equivalently returns
which are less likely to be generated from the ex ante distribution.
As an alternative to the GARCH structure, a more recent alternative specification for
time-varying volatility could adopt realized volatility (RV) models. For daily volatility
estimates, realized volatility models require intra-day data. However, intra-day is not
easily available for many financial assets going back over long histories. This limits the
feasibility of constructing a daily FTS index which goes far back in history, but it is very
possible to construct a monthly FTS index using realized volatilities measured with daily
data. This approach is worth exploring and is left as an extension.
2.2 Stage 2: Rotation and aggregation to identify Flights-to-
Safety
With asset-specific price shocks in hand, the next stage aggregates these shocks to de-
velop a global shock measure while identifying flights-so-safety from broader financial
market movements. The way this is done is by relying on the cross-asset correlations
typically observed during global flights-to-safety. The economics of FTS imply global
portfolio rebalancing such that risky assets are sold and safe assets bid in the face of
rising uncertainty. To capture this flight-to-safety signature, I define a flight-to-safety as
a period (day) when: VIX rises, stocks fall, Treasury yields fall, high yield credit spreads
rise, and Japanese yen appreciates and the Australian Dollar depreciates - depicted in
Table 1.
on prior distributions and estimation design. Despite their differences, GARCH, stochastic volatility,
and realized volatility models, three workhorse models of time-varying volatility, perform quite similarly.
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Table 1: Cross Asset Flight-to-Safety Behavior
Zad Underlying Asset Class FTS Behavior
Zvd CBOE VIX Index Volatility +
Zsd Wilshire 5000 Stock Index Equities -
Zbd 10-year U.S. Treasury Yield Government Rates -
Zhd U.S. High Yield Spread Credit +
Zjd JPY/AUD Exchange Rate Currencies -
With the Zad for all five assets, the global daily FTS index (FTSd) is constructed as
the rotated cross-section weighted average on each day d:
FTSd = (wvZvd + whZhd − wsZsd − wbZbd − wcZjd)1d,
∑
a∈A
wa = 1, (6)
where the rotations ensure that positive values of FTSd coincide with fight-to-safety
or risk-off, and negative values coincide with risk-on episodes. Hence, the shocks (Zad)
corresponding to the VIX and high-yield credit spreads have positive weights wa, while
the rest have negative weights. I apply equal weights wa = 1/5 but more generally, one
can assign arbitrary weights wa across assets. Similarly, an estimate of FTSd can be
obtained by taking the first principal component across asset shocks Zad. When doing so,
the estimated signs on factor loadings typically coincide with those in Table 1, although
an additional arbitrary rotation may be needed if the research wants positive values
are to imply flight-to-safety episodes. In practice, there is very little difference between
estimates of FTSd obtained via PCA or the rotated cross-section average. Specifically,
the FTSd estimated as the cross-section average shares a correlation of over 0.98 with
the PCA approach. The added benefit of taking cross-section averages is that it can
be calculated each period without requiring information from the entire sample. A key
advantage of the PCA approach is if the set of variables in Zad becomes very large, it may
become more practical to identify the sign restrictions using PCA rather than imposing
them one-by-one based on economic theory.
2.3 Imposing the flight-to-safety condition
To then identify flight-to-safety shocks, FTSd is multiplied by an indicator 1d which takes
a value of 1 if that day’s cross-asset co-movement was consistent with either flight-to-
safety/risk-off or risk-on, and 0 otherwise (the flight-to-safety condition):
1d


1 if {Zvd, Zhd} > c ∩ {Zsd, Zbd, Zjd} < −c ‘Risk-Off’
1 if {Zvd, Zhd} < −c ∩ {Zsd, Zbd, Zjd} > c ‘Risk-On’
0 otherwise,
(7)
This way, I impose as a necessary condition that all 5 asset returns move in the
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direction consistent with flight-to-safety, with the size of the move necessarily larger than
some threshold c. If asset price movements do not satisfy this restriction, there is no
shock, and FTSd = 0. If they do, the size of the shock is continuous, and can be positive
(‘risk-off’) or negative (‘risk-on’). To start, I set c = 0, meaning a flight-to-safety is
identified simply based on directions of Zad, regardless of the size of the moves. One issue
with this method is that some days may satisfy the FTS condition simply by random
chance, and likely realize low values of FTSd. This introduces noise into the FTS measure,
therefore inducing attenuation bias when interested in the effects of flight-to-safety. One
solution is to require a more conservative threshold for c, taking into account both the
direction and size of cross-asset moves. Considering this alternative, I also set a threshold
of c = 1, meaning that all 5 assets must have |Zad|> 1 on a given day (at least a 1-sigma)
and also move in the direction consistent with flight-to-safety to count as an FTS shock.
Finally, the daily FTS index FTSd can be aggregated to monthly sums, FTSt:
FTSt =
D(t)∑
d=1
FTSd(t), (8)
whereD(t) is the number of days in month t, and FTSd(t) denote daily global fight-to-
safety measures corresponding to month t. By summing the daily values of FTSd, which
can be positive (risk-off), negative (risk-on) or zero (non-event), each months value in
FTSt can be interpreted as the net of the daily positive and negative FTS shocks. A
large positive monthly value of FTSt indicates that month had either/several large global
flight-to-safety days (risk-off) relative to risk-on days and days which were neither risk-on
or risk-off.
2.4 Flight-to-safety shocks: properties and stylized facts
From 2000 to 2019, of the 6,044 days in the sample, 11% have asset co-move in directions
consistent with a flight-to-safety or ‘risk-off’, with 12.4% co-moving in a way consistent
with ‘risk-on’. Note that these proportions do not say anything about the size of the
moves (recall c = 0). Risk-off days are also particularly special in the sense that asset
price moves are significantly larger – statistically and economically – than usual. For
the Wilshire 5000 stock index, the average daily negative return is -0.7%. on a risk-
off day, when negative equity returns are accompanied by rising volatility, falling bond
yields, rising credit spreads and depreciating risky currencies the average daily Wilshire
5000 return nearly doubles to -1.3%. Similar patterns apply across the other four assets.
When the Australian Dollar depreciates (relative to JPY), it depreciates on average -
0.6%. On risk-off days, the average depreciation increases to -1%. When the VIX index
rises, it rises on average 4.2%. On a risk-off day, it rises on average 8.4%.
The VIX index is a common off-the-shelf gauge of global financial conditions. The
10
Figure 2: Time-Series of Global Flight-to-Safety Shocks (FTSt)
'Risk−Off'
'Risk−On'
−2
0
2
Jan 2000 Jan 2005 Jan 2010 Jan 2015 Jan 2020
G
lo
ba
l F
TS
 S
ho
ck
s
First order auto-correlation = 0.067. Series is normalized to have
unit standard deviation.
way FTS shocks are designed, they can be interpreted as a subset of all VIX fluctuations:
the VIX fluctuations which are 1) abnormally large and 2) coincide with large risk-off
co-movements in other asset classes. Table 3 shows that FTSt (which includes VIX
innovations as a component) and changes in the VIX are indeed correlated, but quite
imperfectly. Global FTS shocks can explain roughly 28% of the variation in log changes
in the VIX (correlation of 0.53) suggesting that a majority of information content in the
FTSt measure is distinct from aggregate VIX innovations. Similarly global FTS shocks
explain explain 39% of the variation in U.S. stock returns. These correlations weaken
further when increasing the threshold to c = 1 which more conservatively identifies flight-
to-safety episodes as tail shocks. On one hand, this highlights a rather substantive role
of flight-to-safety in driving asset specific movements. Meanwhile, the relatively low R2
between FTS shocks and U.S. stock returns and volatility suggests that this measure
captures distinct information content relative to the benchmark fluctuations in global
financial conditions.
FTS shocks do indeed capture shocks to global tail risk. Table 4 provides a list of dated
days between 2000 and 2020 that, based on the daily measure FTSd, are identified as the
largest FTS shocks. The global nature of these shocks becomes apparent: the ‘Chinese
Correction’ (2007), ‘Brexit’ (2016), U.S. President Trump political controversies (2017),
Italian political tensions (2018), and the Lehman bankruptcy (2008) round out the top
five daily global flights-to-safety. Using a different methodology, a similar list is reported
in De Bock and de Carvalho Filho [2015a]. Several flight-to-safety episodes flagged by
FTSd are shared in their list, even though the methodologies differ. None of the ten
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Figure 3: Realized Monthly Volatility of Daily Global Flight-to-
Safety Shocks
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Each month’s realized volatility of FTS is computed as the stan-
dard deviation of daily values of FTSd for each month. Structural
break occurs in February 2007.
largest global FTS shocks correspond with the largest U.S. stock market crashes. Table 5
lists the top 10 largest daily stock market percent declines between the same period Most
of the largest stock market crashes occurred during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis,
and another the popping 2000 Tech Bubble. Table 6 shows the top 10 largest percent
changes in the VIX index – three overlap with the top 10 daily largest FTS shocks.
The largest VIX shock reflects the ‘VIXplosion’ (2018), considered by many practitioners
as a technical event caused by overcrowded short volatility positions. It’s particularly
interesting to point out that despite four of the 5 assets used to estimate FTS shocks
FTSt are U.S. based, they appear to do well in capturing shocks which are non-U.S.
based, bearing global implications.
A time-series of monthly FTS shocks is shown in Figure 2. Unlike the standard VIX
index or changes in the VIX, neither daily nor monthly measures of FTS shocks (FTSd
or FTSt) exhibit significant serial correlation - an important feature which should be
necessary, but not sufficient, in a measure of global FTS shocks. The volatility of FTS
shocks have also markedly increased since 2007 (Figure 3). Each month the realized
volatility is computed by taking the standard deviation of daily FTSd shocks within that
month. The volatility of FTS shocks after February 2007 is 75% larger than before 2007.
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2.5 Discussion
Not only do large flights-to-safety consistently map back to well known globally dis-
ruptive events, they have large impacts on non-financial prices closely tied to economic
fundamentals, namely commodity prices and inflation expectations. Taken together, this
points to large financial shocks coinciding with shocks that affect beliefs over global de-
mand. For example, flights-to-safety would be consistent with news shocks that induce
renewed pessimism over global growth which endogenously increases risk aversion. This
casts doubt on the assumption that large fluctuations in financial market indicators –
not just flights-to-safety, but the VIX index, equity returns, volatility, or capital flows
– are unbiased measures of risk preferences. However, it is often prohibitively difficult
to separate the risk premia component from the fundamental component of asset price
moves without imposing many, sometimes exceedingly controversial assumptions. While
this is beyond the main scope of the paper, In Section S2, I attempt to separate the
excess risk sentiment and global demand components embedded in global FTS shocks,
subject to a number of assumptions.
An important observation is that the FTS measure differs substantially from VIX in-
novations. As shown, large values of global flight-to-safety specifically capture tail shocks
which appear differ from extreme VIX movements. Why might the VIX and global flight-
to-safety shocks differ? The VIX index measures the combination of two things. First, the
amount of expected US uncertainty, and second, the pricing of this uncertainty (Bekaert
and Hoerova [2014]). If flight-to-safety shocks are induced by changing preferences to-
wards safety/risk, they will be correlated with the VIX since greater risk aversion would
also directly influence the VIX through the pricing of uncertainty. If this change in risk
preference is exogenous, and macro uncertainty did not structurally change along with
it, then the part of the VIX which changes based on expected uncertainty would not
be affected. However, these two components may be endogenous which complicates the
issue, as changing risk perceptions can re-shape macro uncertainty and vice versa. How-
ever, global FTS shocks and VIX innovations would very likely not be identical. Consider
mean-invariant volatility/uncertainty shocks (Bloom [2009]). These will directly affect
the VIX through shifting macro uncertainty, but not directly affect the pricing of risk
(though volatility may endogenously induce some change in either the nature of the risk
being priced, or the pricing of risk). However, the effects on the two components of the
VIX from a volatility shock will not be proportional to the effects captured within a FTS
shock.
It’s worth noting an important methodological limitation of this approach. Namely
the volatility estimation takes into account the full sample, which poses two issues. In
contrast to out-of-sample forecasts, full-sample estimation induces potential ’look-ahead’
bias. This poses an issue if one’s primary objective is to forecast. On the other hand,
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this is less of an issue if one’s goal is to combine ex ante and ex post information for
explanatory purposes. A potential solution to this problem would be to formulate a
strategy to generate out-of-sample volatility forecasts on a recursive basis. One way would
be to keep the GARCH formulation but require taking a stance on additional parameters
(rolling procedure, window size). This comes with impose a greater computational burden
and substantially reduced the statistical power from estimating over smaller samples. For
robustness, I include an analysis exclusively using the post 2009 sample analysis where I
estimate FTSt in a fully out-of-sample fashion.
3 Global Flights-to-Safety Shocks and World Prices
Table 2 reports R2 statistics from auto-regressions of different global market prices aug-
mented with FTSt−1 (column 2) and FTSt and FTSt−1 (column 3). Some of these
variables are included in the construction of FTSt (VIX, stock returns, high-yield credit
spreads, 10-year yields, AUD/JPY exchange rate), but I focus on the relationship between
lagged FTS shocks, FTSt−1 and current values of these variables. What is striking is the
significant information content of FTSt−1 across many financial and non-financial mar-
ket prices. Past month’s flight-to-safety shock is significantly informative of one-month
ahead changes in the VIX, U.S. 10-year yields, U.S. risky credit spreads, the JPY/AUD
exchange rate, crude oil, broad commodities, and U.S. inflation expectations. What’s
more is that FTSt−1 is more significantly associated with month t changes across these
global indicators than their own lagged t − 1 value for a majority of the above. By
contrast, the U.S. dollar is not significantly led by FTSt−1, but the contemporaneous
association with FTSt is highly significant.
To simulate the response to a global flight-to-safety shock, I estimate a second-order
structural vector auto-regression (SVAR) of monthly log-differences of U.S. short and
medium term yields, USD exchange rates, commodities, and U.S. inflation expectations
where FTS shocks, FTSt, are identified recursively. FTS shocks impact all variables
contemporaneously, consistent with the potent nature of unusual or unexpected events
which trigger flights-to-safety. I trace two sets of impulse responses. The first is the
response to a 1-standard deviation FTS shock, and the second is the response to a 1-
standard deviation FTS shock from an SVAR which controls for contemporaneous log
VIX changes. The purpose of the latter is to test whether FTS shocks indeed contain
information distinct to VIX innovations. Controlling for contemporaneous VIX changes
is a conservative approach, as it attributes the correlation between the VIX and FTS
shocks as being caused by the VIX index, and not FTS.
Figure 4 traces the impulse responses of a 1-SD FTS shock on a variety of commodity
prices, gold, and the USD exchange rate vis-a-vis the G10. The solid line is the response
to a 1-SD FTS shock, FTSt and the dashed line is the response when controlling for VIX
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innovations. Figures 13 and 14 provide additional IRFs for U.S. interest rates, inflation
expectations and additional commodity prices.
Figure 4: Response to a 1-Standard Deviation FTS Shock (Solid)
and after controlling for changes in logged VIX (dashed)
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Cumulative response (in standard deviations) to a 1-standard
deviation structural flight-to-safety (FTS) shock, FTSt, (solid),
and after controlling for contemporaneous changes in logged VIX
(dashed). 90% bootstrapped confidence bands.
Most responses exhibit highly significant adjustment for several months following an
FTS shock, U.S. yields fall along the entire short end of the maturity curve. The impact
on inflation expectations are completely dynamic in the sense that they do not respond
contemporaneously, but respond significantly with a lag to FTS shocks. Commodity
prices fall and the U.S. Dollar appreciates in response to an FTS shock, both in time 0
and subsequent months. The response of commodities is sharp across metals and energy.
The impact of FTS shocks are much less potent among soft commodities (Figure 14,
soybeans, coffee, sugar, lumber). The effect on gold is statistically indifferent from zero.
This may be somewhat surprising given that some view the yellow metal as a safe haven.
The dashed lines trace the same impulse response functions but in a VAR which
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controls for contemporaneous log VIX changes. Importantly, nearly all of the significant
responses to an FTS shock remain significant, although less pronounced suggesting that
FTS shocks indeed contain information distinct from standard measures of financial risk.
Figure 15 shows that the results are robust to an FTS index identified under a more
conservative flight-to-safety condition of c = 1, where both direction of asset price moves
and also size are taken into account.
4 Global Flights-to-Safety and Emerging Markets
Recent debate and research focuses the consequences of global financial shocks on emerg-
ing markets (EMs), many of which are left particularly vulnerable from growing financial
integration. I revisit this issue, specifically to evaluating the dynamics of emerging mar-
kets in response to a global flight-to-safety shock. I collect monthly data on sovereign
spreads and industrial production across 34 emerging markets from 2000 to 2019.6 I
build on several recent studies have investigated the global transmission of world finan-
cial shocks on EM dynamics (Uribe and Yue [2006], Akinci [2013], Caballero et al. [2019],
Kalemli-Ozcan [2019], Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2019], Obstfeld et al. [2019]). The traditional
modeling approach used is a panel regression or VAR which estimates average effects
and impulse response functions (IRF) to a global shock by pooling information across
all countries. While pooling has the advantage of increasing statistical power, it ignores
vital heterogeneity across countries, which surely exists among EMs. A key difference
in my modeling approach is that I allow for country-specific heterogeneity, following an
approach similar to Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2019]. I further show that this heterogeneity
can be used to identify potential transmission mechanisms through which global shocks
transmit to the real economy.
In view of this consideration, I propose a heterogeneous multi-country VAR which
combines elements from the Global Vector Autoregressive (GVAR) Pesaran et al. [2004]
and Factor-augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) Bernanke et al. [2005] frame-
works. Like the benchmark panel VAR, it can be used to report average effects by
pooling results across countries. However, like Fernandez et al. [2017] and Cesa-Bianchi
et al. [2019], my approach builds on previous analyses by also allowing for country-specific
heterogeneity. Key modeling challenges of multi-country economic systems include ac-
counting for 1) global common factors 2) network effects or spillovers between countries
3) spillovers from advanced countries to emerging markets, and 4) heterogeneous trans-
mission of shocks. Consider the baseline model which incorporates these features:
6Data details are found in Section S1.
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
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∆yi,t
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uyi,t
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uYi′,t
uUSi,t
vt


, (9)
where ∆si,t is the change in the log sovereign spread – a proxy for domestic financial
conditions – of country i over month t. Country i’s year-over-year change in industrial
production (IP) in month t is given by ∆yi,t. It’s easy to see that a model with just these
two variables represents a classic VAR(L) model. Country-specific lag polynomials are
expressed as Φi(L) of finite order ℓ. I set the number of lags equal to ℓ = 4 months. The
specification is extended by modeling cross-country linkages through ∆Si′,t and ∆Yi′,t.
These are cross-section averages of changes in the log sovereign spread and year-over-year
IP growth over all countries excluding country i. Specifically,
∆Si′,t = ∆s
∗
i′,t =
∑
i′ 6=i
wsi′∆si′,t,
N−1∑
i′=1
wsi′ = 1,
∆Yi′,t = ∆y
∗
i′,t =
∑
i′ 6=i
wyi′∆yi′,t,
N−1∑
i′=1
wyi′ = 1,
where ∆s∗i′,t is a weighted average of the spread change for countries not including i,
∆si′,t, weighted by w
s
i′ . I set equal weights (w
s
i′ = 1/(N − 1) for all i
′), therefore ∆s∗i′t
can be interpreted as the cross-section average of sovereign spread changes, exclusive of
country i. The same is done for ∆Yi,t, except I exclude Iraq from the calculations given
large outlier values driven by the Iraq War in the early 2000’s. Another approach to
obtaining weights would be to apply GDP weights, bilateral trade-weights or capital flow
weights for wsi′ . However, in this particular setting, because cross-country correlations
are high, these alternatives make no practical difference.
Because sovereign spreads and economic activity exhibit strong co-movement across
emerging markets, ∆Si′,t and ∆Yi′,t can also be thought of as approximations of the
common global factors governing sovereign spreads and IP growth, respectively, admitting
a FAVAR interpretation. As such, one can alternatively estimate ∆Si′,t and ∆Yi′,t using
Principal Components Analysis (PCA), with both the PCA approaches and the cross-
section averaging approach often yielding similar estimates.7
Moreover, including these global averages admit for cross-country interdependencies
7I test both and the factor estimated via averages and that via PCA are highly correlated, close to a
coefficient of 1.
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without running into the ‘Curse of Dimensionality’ issue most large VARs face (hence, also
admitting to a GVAR interpretation). For example, ∆Si′,t and ∆Yi′,t can be thought of
as the inclusion of lagged spreads and IP growth for all other countries in the equations
for country i. Without any coefficient restriction, estimating a VAR(4) would entail
the addition of 33 × 4 × 2 = 264 additional lagged variables, exceeding the number of
observations. However, including cross-sectional averages imply a coefficient restriction
such that lag l spreads and IP growth from all other countries in country i’s equation
have coefficients equal to Φi(L)
1
N−1
. I also include ∆YUS,t changes in U.S. economic
activity, measured using the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) to account
for spillovers between advanced economies and emerging markets.
Finally, FTS shocks FTSt enter the system as an external instrument (Stock and
Watson [2012], Stock and Watson [2018]). Moreover, notice that FTS shocks are treated
as a common shock across all countries to which countries can respond deferentially (as
reflected in the country-specific coefficients θVi ), and the shock is identified recursively.
That is, FTSt can be viewed as a common factor that unlike Si′,t and ∆Yi′,t is completely
external to the system. Recall that FTSt is measured from financial variables either
based out of the U.S. or advanced economies, while the endogenous variables in Equation
9 belong to emerging markets except for ∆YUS,t.
4.1 Estimating the multi-country SVAR and impulse responses
FTS shocks FTSt enter the system as an external instrument. The shock FTSt is struc-
tural, in that it is identified under the recursive assumption that FTSt contemporaneously
affects fast-moving financial variables ∆si,t and ∆Si′,t, while slower-moving macroeco-
nomic variables ∆yi,t, Yi′,t and YUS,t respond to FTS shocks with a lag. In effect, this
requires the FTS shock variable FTSt to be contemporaneously orthogonalized against
the three slow-moving economic activity variables. The results are robust to alternative
ordering restrictions, specifically one such that FTSt contemporaneously affects all other
variables but no other variable contemporaneously affects FTSt. Because we are mainly
concerned with the effect of an FTS shock, the ordering of other variables in the system
is irrelevant.
The large T dimension of the data allows the multi-country SVAR to be estimated
country-by-country, estimating country-specific SVARs for 34 emerging markets. This
estimation procedure is akin to estimating a Global VAR (Pesaran et al. [2004], Chudik
and Pesaran [2016]) with similar approaches also being applied in Fernandez et al. [2017]
and Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2019]. A key advantage of this modeling approach which de-
parts from conventional panel VARs is that the coefficients are heterogeneous – they are
allowed to be country-specific. Given the economic uniqueness across countries particu-
larly observed among EMs, The pooling restriction imposed with panel VARs may be an
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overly restrictive and unrealistic assumption. The heterogeneous modeling approach still
allows estimation of average or pooled effects as done in traditional panel models. Esti-
mating the average IRF over the panel is simple using the Mean Group (MG) estimator
of Pesaran and Smith [1995] and Chudik and Pesaran [2019].8 The horizon h mean group
impulse response function for the endogenous variable, denoted Xit, to a 1-SD FTS shock
is computed as:
MGIRF (h) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
E[Xi,t+h|FTSt = 1]−
1
N
N∑
i=1
E[Xi,t+h|FTSt = 0]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
E[Xi,t+h|FTSt = 1], (10)
with associated non-parametric cross-sectional standard errors computed as:
SE(h) =
√√√√ 1
N
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(
E[Xi,t+h|FTSt = 1]−MGIRF (h)
)2
. (11)
It can be easily seen that the MG IRF is simply the cross-section average of all i
country-specific IRFs, each being denoted E[Xi,t+h|FTSt = 1], at each horizon h. 95%
dispersion intervals for each horizon h which I report in the results are equal to
MGIRF (h)± 1.96× SE(h). (12)
These methods have been applied successfully to large, heterogeneous macroeconomic
panel data of similar size to address a variety of research questions.9
4.2 The average response to a global flight-to-safety shock
I first estimate the model with the aggregate FTS shock, FTSt, and then in a second set of
estimations, I control for contemporaneous changes in the log VIX as a robustness check.
We first examine the pooled dynamics across EMs in response to a global flight-to-safety
shock (dashed lines).
Figure 5 traces the pooled, or MG estimate impulse response of both logged sovereign
spreads and IP growth to a 1-standard deviation FTSt shock (solid), and also the response
after controlling for contemporaneous VIX changes (dashed). Sovereign spreads react
strongly and the response is front-loaded, displaying over-shooting behavior in the first
8Alternatively, the Common Correlated Effects Estimator (CCE) of Pesaran [2006] and Chudik and
Pesaran [2015] can also be applied.
9See for example Dees et al. [2007], Chudik et al. [2017],Hernandez-Vega [2019], Cesa-Bianchi et al.
[2019].
19
Figure 5: Emerging Markets: Average Response to a 1-Standard
Deviation FTS Shock (Solid) and after controlling for changes in
logged VIX (Dashed)
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Cumulative MG Response (Equation 10) to a 1-standard deviation structural
flight-to-safety shock, FTSt (solid), and after controlling for contemporane-
ous VIX innovations (dashed). 95% non-parametric dispersion bands as com-
puted in Equation 12. Log sovereign spread in monthly changes. Industrial
production as year-over-year log change. Thin line in RHS figure is the IRF
of U.S. national economic activity.
few months following the shock. Economic activity significantly contracts over about 18
months. All units are measured in standard deviations to correct for heteroscedasticity
across countries. For the sake of interpretation, the 18-month cumulative response in IP
growth is approximately equivalent to a 4% contraction. For comparison I also show that
U.S. economic activity significantly contracts with a lag following an FTS shock, with
the total contraction occurring faster and a sharper rebound after 12 months.
Both the response in sovereign spreads and the subsequent contraction in IP growth
remain significant after controlling for changes in the VIX index, suggesting a distinct
role for FTS shocks in shaping macroeconomic dynamics. Figure 16 shows that these
results are robust to an FTS index identified under a more conservative flight-to-safety
condition of c = 1, where both direction of asset price moves and also size are taken into
account.
5 Incorporating Exchange Market Pressure
Exchange market pressure (EMP), introduced early on in Girton and Roper [1977] along
with its many variants (Hossfeld and Pramor [2018]), is a useful gauge of international
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pressure on the exchange rate either resisted through foreign exchange intervention or
relieved through currency depreciation. EMP severity tends to capture periods of large,
volatile capital inflows or outflows - often straining exchange rates and financial liquidity.
Many recent studies highlight the role of global shocks in driving pressure on international
markets via exchange or capital flow pressures across EMs.10
Figure 6: Emerging Markets: Average Response to a 1-Standard
Deviation FTS Shock (Solid) and after controlling for changes in
logged VIX (Dashed)
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Cumulative MG Response (Equation 10) to a 1-standard deviation structural
flight-to-safety shock, FTSt before (solid) and after controlling for contem-
poraneous VIX innovations (dashed). 95% non-parametric dispersion bands
as computed in Equation 12. Log sovereign spread in monthly changes.
Industrial production as year-over-year log change. Negative values imply
exchange rate percent depreciation. International reserves in monthly log
changes.
To consider the implications of EMP in the presence of global flights-to-safety, I aug-
ment the multi-country VAR with two additional country-specific endogenous variables:
logged changes in USD exchange rates and international reserves. Global flight-to-safety
shocks likely bear implications for EMP and its interaction with economic activity. Cur-
rency mismatch, for example, is a mechanism through which EMP may impact the real
economy, as exchange rate depreciation increases the cost of foreign-denominated lia-
bilities (Eichengreen and Hausmann [1999], Hofmann et al. [2019], Carstens and Shin
[2019].). Known as the financial channel of exchange rates, the pecuniary externality
caused by currency depreciation in the presence of currency mismatch offsets the classi-
cal trade channel where depreciations are considered stimulative. For this reason I focus
on USD exchange rates given the recent evidence on the overwhelming role of the U.S.
Dollar in the international monetary and price system.11
Figure 6 traces the Mean Group IRF from a 1-SD FTS shock (solid) and when control-
ling for VIX changes (dashed) from the model including exchange rates and international
10Fratzscher [2012], Aizenman and Binici [2016], Goldberg and Krogstrup [2018].
11The majority of trade is invoiced in USD, most countries peg to the USD, most international reserves
are held in USD, most international financing is denominated in USD.
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reserves. In addition to sovereign spreads widening and economic activity contracting,
there is significant exchange market pressure across emerging markets. EMP manifests
as both currencies rapidly depreciating against the USD and significant reserves expendi-
ture. Within the first few months, exchange rates depreciate on average of 1.1%. After 10
months, reserves growth drops an average of 1.5%. Both of these effects remain significant
when controlling for changes in the VIX.
The results of large pass-through of global shocks to domestic financial conditions,
exchange rates and subsequent economic activity corroborate the evidence reported in
several of the studies mentioned. However, notably I show that FTS shocks, interpreted
as tail risk perceptions, carry effects distinct from benchmark changes in global financial
conditions. In fact, roughly half of the impact on sovereign spreads and economic activity
is attributed uniquely to FTS shocks after controlling for the VIX. More than half of the
response in EMP continues to be attributed to FTS shocks. Figure 17 shows that the
results are robust to an FTS index identified under a more conservative flight-to-safety
condition of c = 1, where both direction of asset price moves and also size are taken into
account.
6 Global Flight-to-Safety and Cross-Country Het-
erogeneity
Global financial shocks exhibit significant average effects on domestic financial conditions,
exchange market pressure, and subsequent economic activity across emerging markets.
While much of the literature focuses on such pooled estimates, in reality different countries
are likely to bear differential exposure to fluctuations in global financial markets. This
section highlights the degree of heterogeneity in country-specific responses to a global
FTS shock.
Country-specific responses over select horizons are reported in Figure 7 for sovereign
spreads (cumulative 6-month impact) and IP growth (cumulative 18-month impact).
Country-specific responses in exchange rates (6-month cumulative) and reserves (6-month
cumulative) are shown in Figure 8. Indeed, the way EMs respond to a global FTS shock
varies widely. One common pattern, however, is that sovereign spreads unambiguously
rise in response to a global FTS shock, most currencies depreciate, most countries expend
reserves, and most countries realize subsequent economic contractions. But the size of
these effects are far from uniform across countries.
For instance, the sovereign spread responses of Belarus and Egypt are smaller than
that of Russia and El Salvador by a factor of four. The likes of Brazil and Russia
are estimated to realize significantly deep contractions in industrial production over 18
months, while there is no significant link between global FTS shocks and economic activity
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financial shocks.12 International reserves exhibit similar patterns – across most countries,
reserves are expended yet to varying degrees in response to a global FTS shock.
7 The Transmission of Global Shocks through Do-
mestic Financial Factors
Emerging Markets, on average, are subject to significant adjustments in response to
a global flight-to-safety yet the effects vary widely across countries. An issue worth
exploring then is whether these cross-country heterogeneities are systematically linked.
That is, can we infer particular transmission channels which moderate the transmission
of global FTS shocks to emerging market economies? Are global FTS shocks amplified
through their effect on domestic financial conditions (i.e. wider sovereign spreads, or
currency depreciation)?
Explicit identification of transmission channels at the international macro level re-
mains a challenge. Generally speaking, there are two main approaches. The first is to
develop a structural model while the second is a reduced form approach. An example of
the reduced form approach is taken in Akinci [2013] when attempting to quantify whether
or not global financial shocks transmit to the real economy through their effect on do-
mestic financial conditions. A basic counterfactual exercise is done by comparing the
variance decomposition of a financial shock to real economic activity under the baseline
VAR, to the same variance decomposition after shutting down effect of financial shocks on
sovereign spreads (i.e. setting the coefficients in the sovereign spread equations associated
with global financial shocks equal to zero). The results suggest that indeed, global shocks
are amplified through their effect on sovereign spreads. However, the author also notes
that this counterfactual exercise is subject to the Lucas Critique, as it is questionable
whether all other coefficients characterizing the system would in fact stay constant when
shutting one particular channel completely down.
Given the heterogeneity provided by my modeling approach, I extend upon the ap-
proach of Akinci [2013] by exploiting cross-country differences to infer potential transmis-
sion channels. By comparing countries with differential responses to FTS shocks, we can
potentially identify transmission mechanisms without imposing such controversial restric-
tions on the counterfactual estimation. For example, I investigate whether the impact of
FTS shocks on economic activity is significantly stronger for the subset of countries with
highest sovereign spread sensitivity to FTS shocks.
Figure 9 LHS shows across the 34 countries in the panel, the 6-month cumulative
change in the log sovereign spread against the 18-month cumulative change in industrial
production induced by a 1-SD FTS shock. The LHS correlation coefficient equals -0.36
12Venezuela is a special case as the currency has been subject to periodic episodes of hyperinflation.
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Figure 9: Heterogeneous Impact of Global FTS Shocks: 6-month
change in Sovereign Spreads vs. 18-month change in Economic
Activity
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and is statistically significant. Countries which realize wider sovereign spread adjust-
ment in response to an FTS shock are subject to deeper subsequent economic contrac-
tions. Similarly, the center figure shows that countries which experience greater currency
depreciation vis-a-vis the USD amid an FTS shock also realize larger subsequent IP
contractions. By contrast,the RHS figure shows that countries which more aggressively
expend reserves also realize shallower subsequent contractions in industrial production.
Taken together, these associations suggest that the impact of FTS shocks on the real
economy are moderated by the sensitivity of domestic financial factors to FTS shocks.
Figure 10 offers an alternative perspective, tracing the heterogeneity in IP responses by
binning countries based on their domestic financial factor sensitivity. The LHS compares
counties which exhibit high sovereign spread sensitivity to FTS shocks against those
which exhibit low sensitivity, tracing the two groups IP growth response to an FTS
shock. Similar IRFs are reported comparing countries with sensitive exchange rates to
those which have stable, or insensitive exchange rates to FTS shocks (center chart), and
countries which tend to use international reserves to buffer against FTS shocks to those
which don’t (RHS chart). The first two figures both show that countries where sovereign
spreads or exchange rates respond less to an FTS shock, economic activity also contracts
less on average over the longer run. At the same time, countries which more aggressively
expend reserves, ‘leaning against the wind’ during a global FTS shock, exhibit a much
weaker impact of FTS shocks on economic activity.
The evidence of sovereign spreads amplifying the impact of global shocks on the
domestic economy corroborates the findings of Akinci [2013] and Caballero et al. [2019],
while the buffering effects of expending international reserves is in line with Aizenman and
Lee [2007] and Jeanne and Ranciere [2011] among others. However, more controversial
is the finding of contractionary impact of exchange rate depreciation. Our findings point
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Figure 10: Heterogeneous Impact of Global FTS Shocks on In-
dustrial Production comparing Countries with high versus low
financial sensitivities
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refers to low (high) sensitivity group. Solid line is the all-country MG IRF.
towards a financial channel of exchange rates, corroborating Rey [2015] and Hofmann
et al. [2019], contrary to Obstfeld et al. [2019] who show that exchange rate flexibility
buffers against global financial shocks.
8 Do ETFs Amplify the Impact of Flight-to-Safety
Shocks?
The extent to which FTS shocks eventually impact economic activity in emerging markets
suggestively depend on the sensitivity of domestic financial factors. An additional factor
which has received significant attention as of late in the context of global financial cycles is
the role of capital control and macroprudential policies which regulate financial openness.
Specifically the advent of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) in advanced economies gives
global investors considerable access EM investments with the promise of superior liquidity.
With this comes the potential for much greater capital flow volatility. In recent work,
Converse et al. [2020] document that equity and bond ETF flows are significantly more
sensitive to global financial conditions than mutual fund flows, bearing macroeconomic
implications for gross capital flow movements as the market share of ETFs continues to
rise.
In consideration of this view, I investigate whether the impact of FTS shocks differ
systematically in countries which have either equity or bond ETFs available for trade on
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Figure 11: Average Response to a 1-Standard Deviation FTS
Shock for Countries with U.S. ETFs (Solid) and those without
(Dashed)
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response to a 1-SD FTS shock.
U.S. exchanges compared to those which do not. These countries, by virtue of selection,
are likely to have more advanced financial markets and more open capital accounts.
Greater financial development implies that these countries enjoy lower rates on average.
At the same time, these countries may be particularly sensitive to flight-to-safety shocks
and associated sudden capital outflows as global investors withdraw capital from emerging
markets, deemed risky investments. Table S.4 provides the number of U.S. traded ETFs
granting exposure to each country in the sample as of October 2020. Brazil, China,
Mexico and South Africa each have more than 200 U.S. traded ETFs which at least
some financial assets based in those countries. By contrast, several countries have little
or no investment through U.S. ETF holdings: Belarus, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Ecuador,
Vietnam, among others. A clear demarcation is observed between Ukraine, which a U.S.
investor can gain exposure through 7 ETFs and the next country Pakistan, for which the
number of ETFs jump to 47.
Figure 11 shows the frequency distribution (LHS) of countries by number of U.S.
based ETFs. Roughly half of the countries have little or no ETF presence in the United
States. On the RHS, the relationship between the logged number of ETFs per country on
the x-axis and the response of IP growth to a FTS shock is plotted. It’s quite clear from
a cursory look that economic contractions induced bye global FTS shocks are deeper in
countries with greater presence among U.S. ETFs.
Figure 12 traces the IRFs to a 1-SD FTS shock for two different groups of EMs. The
dashed line refers to countries with a substantial presence in the U.S. ETF space (Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico,
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Figure 12: Average Response to a 1-Standard Deviation FTS
Shock for Countries with U.S. ETF presence (dashed) and those
with (solid)
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Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey). The solid line is the
MG IRF for countries with little to no ETF presence (Belarus, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Peru, Senegal, Sri
Lanka, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Vietnam). The minimum number of
ETFs available among the countries with substantial presence is 47 (Pakistan) and the
max is China (571). The minimum for the group with low ETF presence is zero (Belarus,
Cote d’Ivoire, Ecuador, Gabon, Lithuania, Senegal, Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela) and
the maximum is Ukraine with 7 ETFs.
Despite similar responses in sovereign spreads to a global FTS shock, The group of
countries with heavy ETF presence are subject to significantly deeper – roughly four
times deeper – economic contractions than the group without U.S. ETF presence. While
both groups of countries experience heavy exchange market pressure following a global
FTS shock, the groups differ by whether the pressure is relieved through currency de-
preciation or expending reserves. Countries with heavy ETF presence realize relatively
sharper currency depreciation while expending relatively less international reserves, with
the reverse holding for the group without an ETF presence.
This evidence corroborates Converse et al. [2020] in that the growth of ETFs poses
a potential amplification mechanism for the transmission of global shocks, and that this
stretches beyond global financial fluctuations, affecting the real economy in countries with
substantial links to U.S. ETFs.
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9 Cross-Sectional Regression of Macro Sensitivity on
Domestic Financial Factors
Taking stock of the systematic heterogeneities between domestic financial factors and the
transmission of global shocks, there is evidence suggesting that a global FTS shock can
induce deeper subsequent contractions in IP growth when the early response in sovereign
spreads are sharper, when the exchange rate depreciates more, or when there is greater
U.S. ETF presence. Meanwhile, actively using international reserves in response to an
FTS shock is associated with a buffering effect on IP growth. These domestic financial
factors may interact with each other. To analyze the joint influence of these financial
factors on the medium-run impact of FTS shocks on economic activity, I propose the
following cross-sectional regression:
Ei[∆yi,t,t+18|FTSt] = α + β1Ei[∆si,t,t+6|FTSt] + β2Ei[∆fxi,t,t+6|FTSt]+
β3Ei[∆resi,t,t+6|FTSt] + β4 ln(ETFi + 1) + ei, (13)
where the dependent variable Ei[∆yi,t,t+18|FTSt] is country i’s cumulative response in
IP growth to a 1-SD FTS shock after 18 months. Ei[∆si,t,t+6|FTSt], Ei[∆fxi,t,t+6|FTSt],
and Ei[∆resi,t,t+6|FTSt] are the 6-month cumulative response of country i’s sovereign
spread, USD exchange rate, and international reserves to a 1-SD FTS shock, respectively.
Finally ETFi is the number of U.S. traded ETF’s country i maintains a presence within.
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. Note that both the dependent variable
and the independent variables are estimates, thus subject to measurement error. In the
case of uncorrelated measurement error, attenuation will bias the coefficients estimated
by least squares towards zero. Therefore, a most plausible scenario is one where the
standard errors are biased upwards and the point estimates are biased downwards, thus
estimated associations are actually stronger than the estimates from Equation 13 imply.
Table 7 reports the regression results from estimating Equation 13. Deeper subse-
quent IP growth contractions are associated with countries which initially realize wider
sovereign spreads or currency depreciation in response to a FTS shock, but the association
between FX depreciation and subsequent IP growth becomes statistically insignificant.
Countries which expend more reserves as a buffer against an FTS shock realize economic
contractions which are comparatively benign. Moreover, having a larger presence in
the U.S. ETF investable space is associated with deeper economic contractions following
flights-to-safety, and this relationship is highly significant and robust.
Finally, to consider the interaction of international reserves and exchange rate move-
ments which together characterize total exchange market pressure, I include the interac-
tion term, Ei[∆fxi,t,t+6|FTSt]×Ei[∆resi,t,t+6|FTSt], which is abbreviated in the table for
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succinctness. The interaction term is highly significant and negative, while the marginal
effect of exchange rate depreciation is insignificant,and the marginal effect of expending
reserves is highly significant. Therefore a possible interpretation of the three estimates is
that expending reserves (i.e. leaning against the wind) buffers against the real economic
impact following a global FTS shock, and this effect weakens with greater coincident
exchange rate depreciate. In other words, following a global FTS shock, the buffering
effects of expending reserves on subsequent economic growth is most effective when the
exchange rate is successfully stabilized.
Taken together, these domestic financial factors explain up to 63% of variance in the
macroeconomic sensitivity to a global FTS shock across emerging markets.
10 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a new measure of shocks to tail risk perceptions reflecting flight-to-
safety. The largest daily FTS shocks do not correspond with the largest stock market
crashes nor a majority of the largest jumps in the VIX index. Flight-to-safety shocks do
map to economically disruptive historical events, inform current and future changes in
interest rates, exchange rates, commodities and inflation expectations, containing both
components reflecting shifting risk sentiment and global demand. In Section S2 of the
Online Supplement, I further investigate the separation of FTS shocks into excess risk
sentiment and global demand components.
Using global FTS shocks as an external instrument, I investigate the way they shape
macroeconomic dynamics in a panel of 34 emerging markets and the U.S.. I extend
prevailing modeling approaches by estimating a multi-country structural VAR which
allows for country-specific heterogeneity, and common factors which capture spillovers
between countries and from the U.S. in both economic and financial fluctuations. In
response to a global FTS shock, sovereign spreads widen dramatically, exchange market
pressure increases and economic activity subsequently contracts in both emerging markets
and the U.S. These effects are robust to controlling for fluctuations in the VIX index,
implying that global FTS shocks, specifically capturing macro tail shocks, pose distinct
implications for the global economy.
I further show that there is significant country-specific heterogeneity in the impact
of FTS shocks across EMs. Countries realizing sharper adjustment in their sovereign
spreads and greater currency depreciation are subject to deeper subsequent economic con-
tractions. Meanwhile, countries which aggressively expend international reserves, leaning
against the wind in response to an FTS shock, are subject to smaller subsequent economic
contractions, especially when the exchange rate is successfully stabilized. Moreover, the
impact of FTS shocks on economic growth is significantly amplified among countries with
substantial presence within U.S. traded ETFs.
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The role of domestic financial factors moderating the pass-through of global shocks
to local economic conditions coincides with the findings of Aizenman et al. [2016] and
Kalemli-Ozcan [2019] among others. Overall, these findings suggest an important role for
macroprudential and monetary policies to buffer against external shocks in a financially
integrated world. Namely, international reserves may be an important policy in the
central bank tool kit. The transmission of global shocks and by affecting sovereign risk
premia introduces a particularly complicated trade-off faced by governments which rely
on international capital markets for financing. The amplification mechanism of global
shocks through highly volatile investment flows, particularly through ETFs, also warrants
further research given the rapidly expanding footprint of the industry.
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Figure 13: Response to a 1-Standard Deviation FTS Shock
(Solid) and after controlling for changes in log VIX (dashed)
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Cumulative response (in standard deviations) to a 1-standard
deviation structural flight-to-safety (FTS) shock, FTSt, (solid),
and after controlling for contemporaneous changes in logged VIX
(dashed). 90% bootstrapped confidence bands.
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Figure 14: Response to a 1-Standard Deviation FTS Shock
(Solid) and after controlling for changes in log VIX (dashed)
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Cumulative response (in standard deviations) to a 1-standard
deviation structural flight-to-safety (FTS) shock, FTSt, (solid),
and after controlling for contemporaneous changes in logged VIX
(dashed). 90% bootstrapped confidence bands.
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Figure 15: Setting FTS Condition threshold c = 1, Response to
a 1-Standard Deviation FTS Shock (Solid) and after controlling
for changes in log VIX (dashed)
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deviation structural flight-to-safety (FTS) shock, FTSt, (solid),
and after controlling for contemporaneous changes in logged VIX
(dashed). 90% bootstrapped confidence bands.
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Figure 16: Setting FTS Condition threshold c = 1, Response to
a 1-Standard Deviation FTS Shock (Solid) and after controlling
for changes in log VIX (dashed)
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Figure 17: Setting FTS Condition threshold c = 1, Response to
a 1-Standard Deviation FTS Shock (Solid) and after controlling
for changes in log VIX (dashed)
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Table 2: R2 estimates of autoregressions augmented with FTSt−1
Monthly Changes in: AR(1) AR(1)+FTSt−1 AR(1)+FTSt−1+FTSt
1 CBOE VIX Index 0.00 0.02** 0.30**
2 Wilshire 5000 Index 0.01 0.01 0.40*
3 10-year U.S.Yield 0.05 0.11*** 0.19***
4 U.S. High Yield Spread 0.11 0.22*** 0.44***
5 USD/G10 Exchange Rate 0.13 0.14 0.19
6 JPY/AUD Exchange Rate 0.09 0.18*** 0.35***
7 WTI Crude Oil 0.07 0.11*** 0.15***
8 Copper 0.18 0.20*** 0.20***
9 1-year U.S. Infl. Exp. 0.05 0.11*** 0.11***
10 10-year U.S. Infl. Exp. 0.00 0.18*** 0.18***
R2 from an AR(1) regression and that of an AR(1) augmented
with FTSt−1 and FTSt. Monthly data. *,**,*** reflects signifi-
cance of FTSt−1 estimate at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respec-
tively. All variables are in logs except U.S. inflation expectations.
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Table 3: Correlations of FTS Shocks and Macro-Financial Aggre-
gates
FTSt VIX Stocks U.S. 10Y USD/G10 Oil U.S. U.S. EM
Yield Unemp. NA IP
FTSt 1
VIX 0.534 1
Stocks -0.625 -0.613 1
10Y UST -0.294 -0.22 0.185 1
USD/G10 -0.279 -0.195 0.292 -0.055 1
Oil -0.218 -0.236 0.203 0.34 -0.357 1
U.S. Unemp. 0.172 0.1 -0.309 -0.127 0.13 -0.184 1
U.S. NA -0.228 -0.133 0.338 0.138 -0.221 0.235 -0.87 1
EM IP -0.097 -0.011 0.12 -0.016 -0.153 0.206 -0.355 0.449 1
Correlations of FTS shocks with log changes in the VIX, Wilshire
5000 equity index, 10 Year U.S. Treasury Yields, USD/G10 index
(negative is USD appreciation), WTI crude oil, 6-month forward
change in U.S. Unemployment (US UR), 6-month forward change
in U.S. national activity (U.S. NA), 6-month forward change in
emerging market log Industrial Production (EM IP), respectively.
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Table 4: Largest Daily Global FTS Shocks, 2000-2019
Description Date FTSd
1. Chinese Correction: Authorities announced plans to curb
speculation
2007-02-27 5.34
2. British referendum votes to exit E.U. 2016-06-24 5.20
3. U.S. President Trump controversy 2017-05-17 4.11
4. Italian political tensions, speculation of E.U. exit 2018-05-29 3.48
5. Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy 2008-09-15 3.47
6. Arab Spring - Instability in the Middle East and North
Africa
2011-02-22 3.29
7. ECB announces no new emergency support for Greece;
Greece calls for bailout referendum
2015-06-29 3.24
8. Global growth pessimism communicated by the Fed 2019-03-22 2.98
9. S&P downgraded Greece’s credit rating to ’junk’ 2010-04-27 2.98
10. U.S. - China trade war intensifies 2019-08-05 2.95
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Table 5: Largest Daily Percent Wilshire 5000 Declines, 2000-2019
Description Date Change
1. GFC: NBER confirms U.S. recession 2008-12-01 -9.6%
2. 2008 GFC 2008-10-15 -9.4%
3. GFC: Congress rejects bank bailout bill 2008-09-29 -8.75%
4. 2008 GFC 2008-10-09 -7.8%
5. U.S. credit downgrade from AAA to AA+ by S&P 2011-08-08 -7.2%
6. 2008 GFC 2008-11-20 -7.1%
7. Tech Bubble Crash 2000-04-14 -6.6%
8. 2008 GFC 2008-11-19 -6.6%
9. 2008 GFC 2008-10-22 -6.1%
10. GFC: Fed communicates negative outlook 2008-10-07 -5.9%
Table 6: Largest Daily Log VIX (Percent) Changes, 2000-2019
Description Date Change
1. ’VIXplosion 2018-02-05 +76.8%
2. Chinese Correction: Authorities announced plans to curb
speculation
2007-02-27 +49.6%
3. U.S. credit downgrade from AAA to AA+ by S&P 2011-08-08 +40.5%
4. British referendum votes to exit E.U. 2016-06-24 +40.1%
5. China slowdown 2015-08-21 +38.1%
6. U.S. President Trump controversey 2017-05-17 +38.1%
7.China introduces new exchange rate mechanism ahead of po-
tential Fed hike
2015-08-24 +37.3%
8. N. Korea announces plans to attack the U.S. Naval Base
Guam
2017-08-10 +36.7%
9. U.S. China Trade war concerns 2018-10-10 +36.4%
10. Boston Marathon terrorist attack 2013-04-15 +35.9%
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Table 7: Domestic Financial Factors and the Impact of FTS
shocks on Economic Activity
Dependent variable:
18-Month Response of IP Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.217 0.361 0.308 0.519 0.104
(0.364) (0.369) (0.390) (0.327) (0.309)
6M Spread Response −1.369∗∗ −1.278∗ −1.632∗∗ −1.272∗∗ −0.836
(0.655) (0.731) (0.750) (0.563) (0.590)
6M FX Response 18.118 17.244 12.300 1.232
(12.617) (14.885) (11.071) (7.251)
6M Reserves Response −20.640∗∗ −12.597 −29.596∗∗∗
(10.235) (9.674) (10.136)
ln(ETFi + 1) −0.140
∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.035)
6M FX × 6M Reserves −1,716.504∗∗∗
(523.335)
Observations 34 34 34 34 34
R2 0.129 0.199 0.361 0.540 0.627
Adjusted R2 0.102 0.148 0.297 0.476 0.560
Robust standard errors. *, **, *** correspond to significance at
the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Dependent variable is
the cumulative 18-month expected response of IP growth (in SDs)
to a 1-SD FTS shock (Dependent and independent variable de-
scriptions found in Equation 13). The final independent variable
is the interaction of the 6-month cumulative response of country
i’s exchange rate to a 1-SD FTS shock and the 6-month cumu-
lative response of country i’s international reserves. IP growth
and changes in log spreads are in units of standard deviations.
Exchange rate and reserves are in log changes.
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This Online Supplement is organized in four sections. Section S1 provides detail
on relevant data and sources. Section S2 describes a method to separate excess risk
sentiment from the global demand component embedded in Flight-to-Safety shocks, and
then provides supplementary results.
S1 Data
Data is collected from a variety of sources. To construct global flight-to-safety shocks, the
underlying daily data on the VIX Index, Wilshire 5000 index, 10-year Treasury yields,
U.S. corporate high yield spreads, and AUD/JPY exchange rate are taken from the
FRED database. The daily data is eventually aggregated to a monthly frequency for
further analysis.
Monthly average sovereign spreads are measured with J.P. Morgan EMBI indices.
The sample contains monthly data on spreads for 34 countries over the period 2000-2019.
All countries have at least 99 observations, Log changes in EMBI spreads are computed
as:
∆sit = ln(
Sit
Si,t−1
),
where Sit is the average EMBI spread level for country i over month t. Because the
analysis relies on changes in the log EMBI spread, the bulk of summary statistics are
reported on ∆sit. Table S.1 reports summary statistics on changes in sovereign spreads
across countries. outlier observations of logged EMBI changes greater than +200% or
less than -100% are removed.
Monthly industrial production data across countries is taken from the World Bank.
Year-on-Year changes in log industrial production are computed as:
∆yit = ln(
Yit
Yi,t−12
),
S1
where Yit is the nominal industrial production of country i in month t. Summary
statistics for year-over-year changes in log industrial production are reported in Table
S.2. Iraq experienced very large swings in industrial production during the early 2000’s
when it was invaded and under military occupation. This is visible in her summary
statistics.
Table S.3 report summary statistics on select commodity and financial market vari-
ables at the monthly frequency. The values are monthly average changes, not end-of-
month changes. It includes all components used to construct the global FTS index along
with interest rates and commodities.
For emerging markets, country-specific measures of nominal USD exchange rates are
from the IMF. These are monthly averages, with changes in log exchange rates inter-
preted as log returns. Positive changes in denote domestic appreciation vis-a-vis the
USD. Country-specific measures of international reserves are taken from the IMF as well.
These are denominated in USD. Reserves growth rates are computed as changes in log
monthly reserves, where positive monthly growth denotes reserves accumulation.
S2
Table S.1: Summary Statistics for Changes in Log EMBI Spread
Country T Min Max Mean Median SD Median Level
Argentina 235 -0.730 0.686 0.009 -0.004 0.139 722.793
Belarus 107 -0.248 0.511 -0.007 -0.014 0.116 625.614
Brazil 235 -0.204 0.525 -0.005 -0.019 0.103 270.003
Chile 235 -0.368 0.487 -0.000 -0.002 0.096 139.650
China 235 -0.808 0.659 0.002 0.000 0.127 138.411
Colombia 235 -0.255 0.670 -0.004 -0.020 0.112 216.005
Cote d’Ivoire 235 -0.453 0.305 -0.003 -0.005 0.075 1106.238
Croatia 235 -0.270 0.371 -0.045 -0.070 0.103 257.671
Ecuador 235 -0.769 0.806 -0.007 -0.016 0.139 788.271
Egypt 217 -0.561 0.986 0.010 -0.010 0.187 349.198
El Salvador 208 -0.216 0.550 0.003 -0.006 0.093 376.053
Gabon 140 -0.267 0.646 0.003 -0.006 0.126 425.400
Hungary 235 -0.709 0.823 0.001 -0.002 0.167 123.800
Indonesia 182 -0.300 0.733 -0.004 -0.017 0.113 239.111
Iraq 160 -0.231 0.346 0.000 -0.003 0.095 520.688
Jordan 103 -0.348 0.374 -0.000 0.010 0.081 382.145
Kazakhstan 146 -0.279 0.669 0.001 -0.010 0.133 298.227
Lithuania 117 -0.459 0.395 -0.020 -0.023 0.151 123.726
Malaysia 235 -0.284 0.589 -0.001 -0.007 0.104 141.806
Mexico 235 -0.221 0.584 -0.001 -0.010 0.092 219.976
Pakistan 218 -0.525 0.523 -0.041 -0.024 0.179 512.429
Peru 235 -0.248 0.663 -0.005 -0.019 0.115 194.396
Philippines 235 -0.226 0.561 -0.006 -0.007 0.101 217.405
Poland 235 -0.671 0.582 -0.007 0.008 0.138 109.399
Russia 235 -0.266 0.629 -0.010 -0.025 0.117 241.053
Senegal 99 -0.166 0.213 -0.001 -0.003 0.077 450.697
South Africa 235 -0.261 0.650 0.001 -0.004 0.110 236.514
Sri Lanka 141 -0.285 0.658 -0.001 -0.009 0.115 412.982
Tunisia 207 -0.525 0.481 -0.018 -0.049 0.123 209.755
Turkey 235 -0.241 0.532 0.001 -0.008 0.108 305.410
Ukraine 231 -0.475 0.974 -0.006 -0.012 0.148 620.636
Uruguay 218 -0.340 0.576 -0.002 -0.019 0.114 230.800
Venezuela 235 -0.209 0.605 0.011 0.001 0.109 1038.486
Vietnam 164 -0.283 0.665 -0.002 -0.005 0.137 249.750
Summary statistics for ∆sit (Equation 9), monthly changes in
the log EMBI spread. Column 8, Median Level, reports the me-
dian level of each country’s EMBI spread. SD refers to standard
deviation.
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Table S.2: Summary Statistics for Year-over-Year Change in Log
Industrial Production
Country T Min Max Mean Medan SD
Argentina 235 -0.222 0.245 0.022 0.023 0.078
Belarus 151 -0.109 1.997 0.259 0.136 0.436
Brazil 235 -0.170 0.190 0.012 0.013 0.064
Chile 235 -0.131 0.140 0.021 0.027 0.044
China 235 0.038 0.207 0.116 0.114 0.044
Colombia 235 -0.143 0.163 0.025 0.020 0.054
Cote d’Ivoire 195 -0.501 0.581 0.027 0.035 0.163
Croatia 235 -0.142 0.131 0.014 0.017 0.052
Ecuador 235 -0.170 0.491 0.043 0.050 0.078
Egypt 175 -0.145 0.410 0.044 0.034 0.081
El Salvador 235 -0.046 0.079 0.014 0.014 0.023
Gabon 235 -0.377 0.426 -0.005 0.018 0.137
Hungary 235 -0.302 0.291 0.046 0.056 0.087
Indonesia 235 -0.136 0.345 0.040 0.038 0.053
Iraq 235 -0.830 11.500 0.144 0.087 0.860
Jordan 235 -0.229 0.286 0.022 0.015 0.078
Kazakhstan 235 -0.096 0.414 0.072 0.059 0.083
Lithuania 235 -0.260 0.381 0.048 0.050 0.088
Malaysia 235 -0.176 0.234 0.042 0.040 0.063
Mexico 235 -0.177 0.148 0.016 0.022 0.048
Pakistan 235 -0.195 0.319 0.049 0.039 0.084
Peru 235 -0.141 0.222 0.037 0.037 0.073
Philippines 235 -0.287 0.360 0.025 0.025 0.110
Poland 235 -0.153 0.234 0.054 0.055 0.059
Russian 235 -0.170 0.263 0.037 0.040 0.054
Senegal 151 -0.224 0.609 0.060 0.042 0.127
South Africa 235 -0.232 0.100 0.012 0.018 0.051
Sri Lanka 104 -0.143 0.193 0.025 0.020 0.059
Tunisia 235 -0.177 0.165 0.007 0.000 0.050
Turkey 235 -0.240 0.294 0.055 0.065 0.092
Ukraine 200 -0.308 0.221 0.011 0.023 0.107
Uruguay 200 -0.311 0.572 0.048 0.037 0.127
Venezuela 235 -0.648 1.832 -0.045 -0.015 0.229
Vietnam 128 -0.504 0.679 0.104 0.103 0.214
Summary statistics for ∆yit (Equation 9). Iraq’s large minimum
and maximum driven by the war period in the early 2000s. SD
refers to standard deviation.
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Table S.3: Summary Statistics for Select Financial and Commod-
ity Market Variables
Market Variable N Mean SD Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
VIX 235 −0.001 0.167 −0.373 −0.098 0.068 0.708
U.S. High Yield Credit Spread 235 −0.0005 0.088 −0.223 −0.059 0.043 0.486
Wilshire 5000 Index 235 0.0002 0.002 −0.008 −0.001 0.002 0.005
JPY/AUD Exchange Rate 235 0.0002 0.034 −0.241 −0.015 0.020 0.082
10-year Treasury Yield 235 −0.006 0.070 −0.378 −0.046 0.034 0.194
3-month Treasury Yield 235 −0.004 0.329 −1.738 −0.072 0.065 2.025
2-year Treasury Yield 235 −0.006 0.124 −0.568 −0.070 0.061 0.316
5-year Treasury Yield 235 −0.006 0.100 −0.411 −0.058 0.046 0.360
1-year Inflation Expectations 235 −0.0001 0.004 −0.013 −0.002 0.002 0.017
2-year Inflation Expectations 235 −0.0001 0.002 −0.006 −0.001 0.001 0.008
10-year Inflation Expectations 235 −0.007 0.101 −0.368 −0.067 0.059 0.253
USD/G10 Exchange Rate 235 −0.0002 0.019 −0.050 −0.013 0.013 0.082
Copper Price 235 0.005 0.065 −0.354 −0.025 0.038 0.230
WTI Crude Oil Price 235 0.003 0.087 −0.332 −0.045 0.060 0.214
Gold Price 235 0.007 0.037 −0.124 −0.016 0.032 0.115
Inflation expectations are monthly changes (not logged). All oth-
ers are monthly changes in logs. Inflation expectations are esti-
mated using the method of Haubrich et al. [2012].
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Table S.4: U.S. Traded ETFs Granting Exposure to an EM Coun-
try
Country Number of ETFs
1 Argentina 112
2 Belarus 0
3 Brazil 281
4 Chile 118
5 China 571
6 Colombia 101
7 Cote d’Ivoire 0
8 Croatia 1
9 Ecuador 0
10 Egypt 60
11 El Salvador 0
12 Gabon 0
13 Hungary 58
14 Indonesia 127
15 Iraq 3
16 Jordan 3
17 Kazakhstan 6
18 Lithuania 0
19 Malaysia 193
20 Mexico 340
21 Pakistan 47
22 Peru 6
23 Philippines 109
24 Poland 106
25 Russia 162
26 Senegal 0
27 South Africa 231
28 Sri Lanka 2
29 Tunisia 0
30 Turkey 107
31 Ukraine 7
32 Uruguay 0
33 Venezuela 0
34 Vietnam 1
Source: etfdb.com. Data collected as of October 2020.
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S2 Flight-to-Safety, Excess Risk Sentiment, and Global
Demand
Large global shocks measured with asset prices reflect both risk sentiment and global
demand - the latter referring to changing beliefs over future fundamentals. It’s evident
that global FTS shocks, a product of asset price movements, exhibits clear links to global
demand shown by their impact on commodity prices and U.S. inflation expectations and
also by the economic relevance of the events triggering them. While the impact of FTS
shocks itself is the main focus of this paper, I also isolate the effects induced by the
excess risk sentiment component of FTS shocks to better understand the macroeconomic
implications of global risk sentiment.
In this section I propose a simple reduced-form separation of FTS shocks into their
global demand and excess risk sentiment components. This is accomplished by estimating
a principal components regression (PCR) of global FTS shocks on the common factor in
world commodity prices, an established proxy for global demand. The obtained residual
then reflects the component of global FTS that is left unexplained by the contempora-
neous adjustment in commodity prices, which I refer to as excess risk sentiment. More
explicitly, I define excess risk sentiment as the component of risk affecting financial asset
prices as pure risk premia; it is excess in that it has no causal effect on fundamental
global demand and simply serves to compensate risk aversion.
Suppose FTS shocks were made up of two orthogonal components,
FTSt = Gt + Vt, (S.1)
where Gt reflects global demand, and Vt is the excess risk sentiment. It’s ‘excess’
because it is the risk sentiment reflected in asset prices above and beyond whatever effect
risk has had on global demand (which is absorbed in Gt). However these two components
are unobserved, and therefore must be estimated. Therefore to recover the excess risk
sentiment component, I regress FTSt on an estimate for global demand Ĝt, which I
measure as the common factor in commodity prices:
FTSt = βˆγ∆Ct︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ĝt
+ǫVt , V̂t = ǫ
V
t , (S.2)
where
γ∆Ct =
K∑
k=1
γk∆ck,t. (S.3)
∆Ct is a T × k matrix of log returns from a broad set of k commodity prices, and
coefficients γk as set such γ
′∆Ct reflects the first principal component of the space of
S7
Figure S.1: Separating Global Flights-to-Safety Shocks into Ex-
cess Risk Sentiment (V̂t) and Global Demand (Ĝt)
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Both series are normalized to have unit standard deviation.
commodity returns (i.e. the vector which maximizes the variance across the space of
commodities). Specifically, I estimate Ĝt using Principal Components Analysis (PCA)
over a broad set of 66 commodity prices. The first principal component is our estimate
of Ĝt. Each commodity price series is log-differenced and standardized. Then, by then
regressing FTSt on the common commodity factor, I define the obtained residual ǫ
V
t as
excess risk sentiment V̂t.
Figure S.1 shows the decomposition of FTS shocks into risk premia and global demand,
respectively. Starkly, the 2008-2009 global financial crisis is identified as a large, negative
global demand shock. October 2008, November 2008, and August 2008 reflect a -7.26,
-4.4, and -3 standard deviation global demand shock, respectively. These are identified
as having little risk sentiment component. Meanwhile, September 2008 reflects a joint
risk sentiment (+2.79 SDs) and global demand shock (-2.33 SDs). Meanwhile, May 2019
reads as a 2.95 standard deviation risk sentiment shock and -0.74 standard deviation
global demand shock, amid the U.S. - China trade tensions. June 2002 reflects a 2-
standard deviation risk sentiment shock amid the Dot Com bubble bursting.
S2.1 World prices and the excess risk component of FTS shocks
Figures S.3, S.4, and S.5 trace IRFs from a 1-SD FTS shock, and also a 1-SD shock to
the excess risk sentiment component, Vt (dashed) on world prices. The risk sentiment
channel is responsible for 50% of the total response among commodities. For the U.S.
Dollar, roughly half of the response during flights-to-safety is driven by risk sentiment,
which is surprisingly low given the active debate over its role as a prominent indicator
of global financial risk. By contrast, the impact of FTS shocks on U.S. interest rates is
predominantly driven by excess risk sentiment.
Relative to financial asset prices, the global demand channel contributes significantly
to the total response of commodities and the U.S. Dollar during flights-to-safety. This
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is the case despite excess risk sentiment shocks accounting for most of the variation in
flights-to-safety. The response in gold increases after isolating the risk shock. Gold
prices is most interesting - appreciating significantly when isolating the risk sentiment
component, validating its role as a safe haven commodity. It also implies that gold prices
covary positively with risk shocks and global demand shocks. Because global FTS shocks
tend to act as joint shocks to demand and risk sentiment, the response to a total FTs shock
hides the significant effect of the risk sentiment channel on gold. By contrast, another
safe haven asset, the U.S. Dollar, appreciates in response to heightened risk sentiment
or lower global demand. So while gold may provide a hedge against rising uncertainty
(but not weaker global demand), the U.S. Dollar provides a hedge against both greater
uncertainty and weaker global demand.
S2.2 Emerging Markets and the excess risk component of FTS
shocks
Figure S.6 shows the impact of a 1-SD FTS shock on emerging markets, along with
the isolated excess risk component (dashed). Most of the response in sovereign spreads
is driven by risk sentiment, while about half of the response in industrial production
growth is attributed to risk sentiment, the other attributed to global demand. Similarly,
the response observed in exchange market pressure (exchange rates and international
reserves) is driven by a mix of both risk sentiment and global demand.
S2.3 Endogeneity and assumptions for separating excess risk
sentiment component of global FTS shocks
The reduced-form approach to recover a measure of global excess risk sentiment has the
advantage of being convenient, robust and practical. The separation issue, however is
subject to complications when taking into account the presence of endogeneity: changing
risk perceptions themselves can affect global demand (Bloom [2009] Caballero and Simsek
[2020]) and vice versa. Like asset prices, global FTS shocks, therefore, likely contain both
a global demand and risk sentiment component, and the two may be correlated with one
another. For the principal-components regression approach to consistently estimate true
excess risk sentiment, there are a number of underlying conditions that must be satisfied:
1. The 1st principal component (PC) of commodity price returns reflects global demand.
2. Weak exogeneity of excess risk sentiment.
3. Commodity prices do not pay risk premium on aggregate risk.
I discuss these issues here to acknowledge the limitations associated with them and
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evaluate how reasonable each assumption may be. The second issue, weak exogeneity
of excess risk sentiment implies that global demand is not contemporaneously impacted
by excess risk sentiment, but can be impacted with a lag. Point 3 follows from points
1 and 2. If the 1st PC of commodity returns is in fact a proxy for global demand
and is additionally not influenced by excess risk premia the way financial asset prices
are, we should observe that investors in particularly pro-cyclical commodities are not
compensated for the aggregate risk they bear. Importantly, point 3 is empirically testable.
The 1st PC of commodity price returns reflects global demand
The common factor in commodity prices, to proxy global demand, Gt, must first reflect
fluctuations in global demand. Recent and building evidence suggests this condition is
validated (Kilian [2009], Kilian and Zhou [2018] Delle Chiaie et al. [2018], Alquist et al.
[2020]). Importantly, global demand shocks are also not the same as fluctuations in global
activity. Global demand shocks can exhibit more volatility and move significantly faster
in reflecting information than, say, real GDP. This means that controlling for global de-
mand is not the same as regressing FTSt on slow-moving macroeconomic aggregates.
Commodity prices exhibit the unique feature of being both tied to the fundamental econ-
omy and adjusting at a relatively fast pace (Bailey and Chan [1993], Hong and Yogo
[2012]). In fact, some highly financialized commodity markets, like crude oil, respond
to information at the speed of liquid financial markets. Less liquid commodity markets
may exhibit stickier prices, but often these prices still adjust faster than macroeconomic
aggregates.
Weak exogeneity excess risk sentiment
For illustration, suppose FTS shocks can be decomposed into asset price movements
reflecting: global demand Gt the component of risk sentiment that affects global demand
ρGt (non-excess risk sentiment), and excess or idiosyncratic risk sentiment component Vt,
FTSt = Gt + Vt, (S.4)
Gt = G˜t − ρ
G
t , (S.5)
where
cov(Gt, Vt) = 0, cov(G˜t, ρ
G
t ) < 0, cov(ρ
G
t , Vt) = 0.
Here, total global demand Gt can be decomposed into the ”pure” demand effect given
by G˜t and non-excess rising risk premia ρ
G
t . Similarly, total risk premia is the sum of ρ
G
t
and excess risk sentiment Vt.
A crucial condition to satisfy the assumption of weak exogoneity is that non-excess risk
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sentiment that impacts global demand ρGt is contemporaneously uncorrelated with excess
risk sentiment Vt. Why might this condition be satisfied? Under the rationale that FTS
shocks tend source from unique, unusual events. These events are unpredictable. And
while the overall ”flight-to-safety” signature is similar across these events, the underlying
components – global demand, non-excess and excess risk sentiment – driving the flight-
to-safety can differ drastically. For example, it may be that the FTS Shock induced by
the September 11 terrorist attack was mostly a risk sentiment shock, while FTS during
the 2008 Global Financial Crisis were contained a larger global demand shock component.
Following the same logic, excess risk sentiment may differ from non-excess risk sentiment
from shock to shock in an uncorrelated way. For instance, excess risk sentiment may
be more related to technical market conditions or intermediary leverage prior to the
FTS shock, while non-excess risk sentiment may be more associated with the degree
of macroeconomic uncertainty caused by an unexpected news shock, therefore having a
stronger impact on growth.
Why might this condition be violated? Excess and non-excess risk sentiment driving
asset prices may be correlated over the business cycle. If excess risk sentiment is deter-
mined by intermediary leverage, and that leverage varies systematically with the business
cycle, the assumption of excess risk premia and non-excess risk premia being uncorrelated
would be violated.
Commodity prices do not pay risk premium on aggregate risk
This condition which follows from the previous assumptions has the advantage of being
empirically testable. That is, consistent separation of excess risk sentiment component of
FTS shocks from global demand using commodity prices, requires that commodity prices
only adjust to changing global demand and not to excess risk premia. This is unlike
financial asset prices, since asset prices adjust to global demand but are also sensitive
to investor risk sentiment. Non-excess risk sentiment can impact commodity prices indi-
rectly by causally impacting global demand, but excess changes in risk sentiment do not
reflect themselves in commodity prices.
To put another way, commodity investors are not compensated for taking on aggre-
gate risk the way it financial assets compensate holders for bearing the same risk. For
this assumption to be violated, heightened risk aversion must directly cause changes to
commodity prices above and beyond any effect transmitting through risk aversion’s effect
on global growth prospects. A violation of this assumption would imply that particularly
pro-cyclical commodities exhibit excess returns. I argue that considerable evidence sug-
gests that this assumption is reasonably satisfied. Even at face value, Table S.5 shows
annualized returns on commodity ETF investments which invest in futures against the
S&P 500 since 2000. Crude oil, copper, and broad commodity prices all exhibit a high de-
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gree of procyclical behavior. Despite this, an investment any of these commodities would
have yielded negative annual returns over the past decade. Evidence of no aggregate risk
premia applies for broad commodity spot returns too. Figure S.2 shows that for a set
of 66 spot commodity returns from 2000-2019, U.S. equity betas are essentially uncor-
related with average returns. If aggregate risk premia was priced in the cross-section of
commodities, commodities with higher betas would exhibit significantly higher average
returns historically.
Table S.5: Commodity Futures Annualized Excess Returns
Date Range Commodity Average Return Daily S&P 500 Beta
2007-2020 WTI Crude Oil -19.2% 0.76
2011-2020 Copper -3.5% 0.42
2007-2020 Commodity Basket -3.9% 0.43
2007-2020 S&P 500 6.16% 1
Daily log returns, annualized. Data taken from ETFs: USO, CPER, DBC,
respectively.
Figure S.2: Cross Section of Monthly Commodity Spot Return
Betas, 2000-2019
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Returns are annualized. U.S. Equity index used is the Wilshire
5000.
More rigorous evidence that commodity investments do not compensate for taking on
aggregate risk has been documented over several decades (Dusak [1973], Feldman and
Till [2006], Erb and Harvey [2006]). Rather, commodity risk premia has been linked
to producer hedging demandS1, which is an idiosyncratic supply-side phenomena and
other factors like momentum (Hirshleifer [1988], Gorton and Rouwenhorst [2006], Gorton
S1This comes from The Theory of Storage: in the face of low inventories, commodity prices and
volatility rise due to risk of ’stock-out’. As a result, consumers of the commodity store supply at
elevated levels. To hedge their production, risk-averse producers must provide additional compensation
to counterparties as incentive to enter into commodity futures contracts.
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et al. [2013], Szymanowska et al. [2014]). Some commodities like energy and metals are
more sensitive to global economic conditions than others (e.g. agriculture). There is
some evidence of positive excess returns among energy and metals, but not related to
associated aggregate risk. Rather, these commodities have higher expected returns during
business cycle peaks when inventory is low, supportive of the producer hedging theory
(Fama and French [1988], Kucher and Kurov [2014], Duncombe et al. [2018]). This goes
in the opposite direction of what standard asset pricing theory would imply.
Figure S.3: Response to a 1-Standard Deviation FTS Shock
(Solid) and the excess risk sentiment component (Dashed)
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Cumulative Response (in standard deviations) to a 1-standard
deviation: structural flight-to-safety (FTS) shock, FTSt, (solid),
and the component attributed to the excess risk sentiment com-
ponent of FTS, Vt (dashed). 90% bootstrapped confidence bands.
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Figure S.4: Response to a 1-Standard Deviation FTS Shock
(Solid) and the excess risk sentiment component (Dashed)
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Cumulative Response (in standard deviations) to a 1-standard
deviation: structural flight-to-safety (FTS) shock, FTSt, (solid),
and the component attributed to the excess risk sentiment com-
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Figure S.5: Response to a 1-Standard Deviation FTS Shock
(Solid) and the excess risk component (Dashed)
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Cumulative Response (in standard deviations) to a 1-standard
deviation: structural flight-to-safety (FTS) shock, FTSt, (solid),
and the component attributed to the excess risk sentiment com-
ponent of FTS, Vt (dashed). 90% bootstrapped confidence bands.
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Figure S.6: Response to a 1-Standard Deviation FTS Shock
(Solid) and the excess risk component (Dashed)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0 10 20 30
Months
St
an
da
rd
 D
ev
ia
tio
ns
Sovereign Spread
−0.75
−0.50
−0.25
0.00
0 10 20 30
Months
St
an
da
rd
 D
ev
ia
tio
ns
Industrial Production
−1.5
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0 10 20 30
Months
%
 C
ha
ng
e
Exchange Rate
−2
−1
0
0 10 20 30
Months
%
 C
ha
ng
e
International Reserves
Cumulative MG Response (Equation 10) to a 1-standard devia-
tion: structural flight-to-safety (FTS) shock, FTSt, (solid), and
the component attributed to the excess risk sentiment compo-
nent of FTS, Vt (dashed). 95% dispersion intervals as computed
in Equation 12. Sovereign spreads and Industrial Production re-
sponse in standard deviations. Exchange rate and international
reserves response in percent. Negative exchange rate movement
is local depreciation vis-a-vis USD.
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